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Abstract  
We investigate shareholder value creation of Spanish listed firms in response to 
announcements of acquisitions of unlisted companies and compare this experience to 
the purchase of listed firms over the period 1991–2006. Similar to foreign markets, 
acquirers of listed targets earn insignificant average abnormal returns, whereas acquirers 
of unlisted targets gain significant positive average abnormal returns. When we relate 
these results to company and transaction characteristics our findings diverge from those 
reported in the literature for other foreign markets, as our evidence suggests that the 
listing status effect is mainly associated with the fact that unlisted firms tend to be 
smaller and lesser–known firms, and thus suffer from a lack of competition in the 
market for corporate control. Consequently, the payment of lower premiums and the 
possibility of diversifying shareholders’ portfolios lead to unlisted firm acquisitions 
being viewed as value–orientated transactions. 
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SHAREHOLDER WEALTH CREATION IN RESPONSE TO 
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ACQUISITIONS OF UNLISTED FIRMS:              
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Any textbook on corporate finance teaches that the main (only) objective of 
managers is to make decisions that maximize firm’s value, increasing, as a result, its 
shareholders’ wealth. One of the major managerial decisions is to acquire a firm. 
However, since the seminal paper of Jensen and Ruback (1983), financial literature has 
mainly focused on the target shareholder wealth creation of listed firms when studying 
the market for corporate control. Evidence has generally suggested that the 
announcement of a takeover bid generates positive gains (that is, economically and 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns) to these shareholders. On the 
contrary, financial literature has paid less attention to the acquirer’s shareholder wealth 
reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid. In this case, evidence shows that the 
bidding firm’s shareholders earn, on average, a zero abnormal return at the acquisition’s 
announcement.1
Nevertheless, many of these conclusions were based on listed firms, while 
acquisitions involving privately held companies represent an important segment of the 
 Therefore, if bidder returns are not positive, why do firms make 
acquisitions? Fuller et al. (2002) discuss some possible explanations. They note that (i) 
zero returns to bidders would be consistent with a competitive corporate control market 
in which firms earn “normal” returns in their operations; (ii) the uncertain outcome of 
the event could make it difficult to isolate the market’s perception of the offer; (iii) the 
stock price reaction to an acquisition may only represent the surprise component of the 
acquisition; and (iv) even good acquisitions might have little impact on the bidder’s 
stock price if targets are small relative to the bidder. In addition, previous research has 
documented that bidder’s abnormal returns are related to a number of factors such as the 
mode of payment [Travlos (1987)] or the diversification into new industries and foreign 
countries [Doukas and Travlos (1988)]. 
                                                 
1 Though there is a tremendous variation in these returns. 
 3 
whole market for corporate control.2 Recent studies on mergers and acquisitions that 
explicitly split their samples into publicly and privately held target companies show this 
pattern. For instance, Moeller et al. (2004) use a sample that contains all completed U.S. 
mergers and acquisitions between 1980 and 2001 (12,023 acquisitions) where 2,642 
were publicly held targets and 5,583 were privately traded targets;3
Aforementioned papers and other studies [Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers 
(2001) and Fuller et al. (2002) for the US market; Draper and Paudyal (2006) for the 
UK market; Martynova and Renneboog (2011) for 28 European countries] document 
significant positive abnormal announcement returns to acquirers of unlisted targets, 
whereas results for buyers of listed companies are mixed (either zero or significant 
negative abnormal announcement returns). Acquirers of private targets gain irrespective 
of the mode of payment (cash, shares or mixed) and the size of the bidder –or the 
relative size of the target compared to the acquirer. In contrast, abnormal returns for 
buyers of listed firms depend on the mode of payment and size, meaning the higher the 
relative target size (the larger acquirer size) paying with shares, the greater the loss. 
 Petmezas (2009) 
examines a sample of 2,973 domestic acquisitions by UK public companies over the 
period from 1984 to 2003, in which listed target firms represented 242 companies and 
unlisted target firms were 2,731; and Faccio et al. (2006) employ a sample of 4,429 
acquisitions over the period 1996 to 2001 by companies incorporated in 17 Western 
European countries where 735 of the targets were listed on an exchange and 3,694 were 
unlisted companies. 
Thus the study of privately held company acquisitions is of interest not only 
because of the volume of operations in which they are involved, but also because they 
exhibit different characteristics from listed targets. For example, liquidity, ownership 
structure, information asymmetry and bargaining power make differences between both 
groups of firms that suggest the need for a separate analysis.4
Previous research on acquirer’s abnormal returns in the Spanish market is scarce 
and shows that acquirer’s shareholders gain an insignificant abnormal return on the 
 
                                                 
2 Note that listed/unlisted, public/private and publicly held/privately held companies are used as 
interchangeable terms. 
3 Moeller et al. (2004) classified 3,799 acquisitions as subsidiary targets. 
4 In section 3 we further discuss these differential characteristics. 
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acquisition’s announcement date.5
This is the first study on the Spanish market that investigates shareholder value 
creation for Spanish listed firms to the acquisition announcement of unlisted companies 
and compares this experience to the bid for listed firms.
 Nevertheless, these studies perform their analyses on 
samples of listed bidder and target firms and unrestricted stake bids. 
6
Our results regarding the listing status of the target firm are similar to other 
studies in foreign markets as we find that acquirers of listed targets earn insignificant 
average abnormal returns, whereas purchasers of unlisted targets gain significant 
positive average abnormal returns regardless of the pricing model used in the estimation 
procedure. However, when we relate these results to firm and transaction characteristics 
our results diverge from those reported in the literature for other foreign markets. 
Hence, our evidence suggests that the listing status phenomenon is mainly associated 
with the fact that unlisted companies tend to be smaller and lesser–known firms, and 
thus suffer from a lack of competition in the market for corporate control. As a result, 
the payment of lower premiums and the possibility of diversifying shareholders’ 
portfolios lead to unlisted firm acquisitions being viewed as value–orientated 
transactions. 
 The lack of research on 
acquisitions of private companies raises the question of whether previous evidence in 
the Spanish market holds true for purchases of private firms. Moreover, we control for a 
variety of firm and transaction characteristics, namely method of payment, buyer’s size, 
relative size of the target and industry and geographical diversification. We also 
examine robustness of our results by estimating excess returns through the CAPM and 
the three–factor model developed by Fama and French (1993). In addition, we employ 
parametric and non parametric tests of abnormal returns. 
Although researchers have made much effort in performing multi–country 
studies (in particular in Europe), in our opinion studies for individual countries are 
necessary. As we state above, some of the evidence from Spain is not consistent with 
                                                 
5 See García and Ferrando (1992), Fernández and García (1995), Fernández and Gómez–Ansón (1999) 
and de Miguel et al. (2003). 
6 Note that in our analysis, the terms bidder, acquirer, purchaser and buyer are used interchangeably 
because for an acquisition to remain in the sample, we require a full transfer of control. 
 5 
that achieved in multi–country studies in which Spanish acquiring firms were included.7 
In our opinion, there are some possible explanations for this discrepancy, such as 
sample selection bias since European samples are dominated by acquisitions by UK 
firms (so that UK acquisitions could overwhelm the results from other countries), data 
availability and consistency, or proper abnormal returns measurement.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuses some 
hypothesis to explain the listing status effect. Section 3 reviews several determinants of 
acquirer’s return and the evidence achieved in previous studies. Section 4 describes our 
sample and the methodology used. The results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 Therefore, 
individual–country studies can be a good way to test the robustness of evidence from 
multi–country studies. 
 
2. WHY SHOULD THE LISTING STATUS OF THE TARGET FIRM 
MATTER? 
Various hypotheses have been proffered to explain the observed phenomenon of 
different bidder firm reaction to the announcement of a private firm acquisition. 
However, not all of them predict positive abnormal returns for buyers acquiring an 
unlisted target or, at least, that they gain more than buyers of listed targets. In any event, 
none of them have been fully successful. 
On one hand, Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller et al. (2002) and Draper and 
Paudyal (2006), among others, point out that privately held companies tend to have 
greater ownership concentration which may imply lower agency conflicts when an 
outside bidding offer is made. Moreover, they do not suffer from public scrutiny that 
may pressure them to sell. These characteristics provide them with stronger bargaining 
                                                 
7 For instance, Faccio et al. (2006) include 119 Spanish listed acquirers and Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011) comprises 55 Spanish listed bidders. However, none of them perform a separate analysis for 
Spain. 
8 Faccio et al. (2006), for instance, compute announcement date abnormal return as the daily acquirer 
stock return minus the daily return of the Datastream stock market index of the acquirer’s home country. 
Though this may play as a proxy, it is not a proper way to compute risk–adjusted abnormal returns. See 
Campbell et al. (2010) for an insightful discussion of this topic. 
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power and the freedom in deciding when and to whom to sell.9
On the other hand, Chang (1998) hypothesises that if the market for corporate 
control is competitive, takeovers should be a zero NPV transaction and therefore the 
bidding firm should gain no abnormal returns (at least when it is paid with cash).
 These characteristics 
suggest that acquirers of unlisted targets should gain less than acquirers of listed targets. 
10
Literature also suggests two hypotheses from the perspective of the Agency 
theory. First, managers motivated by a desire to maximise their private benefits will be 
willing to buy large and prestigious firms and to pay high premiums for them which, in 
turn, will have a negative effect on the bidder’s stock price. Listed firms are usually 
larger and better known than privately held companies. Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
claim that the acquisition of smaller and less well–known firms would be viewed by 
investors as a value–orientated bid, that is, as an acquisition motivated by the desire to 
maximise shareholder’s wealth.
 On 
the contrary, competition in the market for privately held companies is likely to be weak 
as the availability of information to create competition is poor. This lack of information 
availability means that (i) private targets, particularly small ones, face greater 
difficulties to signal their value to investors [Becchetti and Trovato (2002)], and (ii) that 
the bargaining power of purchasers of privately held targets increase. As a result, buyers 
of private firms can experience positive abnormal returns since the likelihood of 
underpayment is high. 
11 Further, when the acquisition is paid with shares, it is 
likely that an outside blockholder could be created as, by definition, private firms are 
closely held [Fuller et al. (2002)]. Nevertheless, when a listed company is acquired such 
concentration is unlikely to emerge since public targets generally have less concentrated 
ownership. Therefore, the existence of a large blockholder allows for greater monitoring 
of a bidder’s management, thus increasing value [Chang (1998)].12
                                                 
9 That is, they have a “valuable timing option” [Ang and Kohers (2001, p. 725)]. 
 The reduction of 
agency costs either because of an objective alignment or an increase in monitoring 
10 We discuss firm and transaction characteristics effects on acquirer’s abnormal returns on the 
announcement date in section 3. 
11 Moreover, these authors point out that smaller private target firms may also be integrated more easily 
into the business of the acquiring firm than larger listed targets. 
12 The correlation between active monitoring of managerial activities and lower agency costs has been 
documented by Ang et al. (2000) and others. 
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activity suggest that purchasers of private firms gain positive abnormal returns when 
acquiring private targets. 
Finally, Hansen and Lott (1996) put forward an alternative explanation for why 
bidders perform relatively better in an acquisition of a private target than a public target. 
They assume that investors are diversified, so the aim of the manager of a firm is not to 
maximize shareholder value but to maximize the value of the shareholder’s portfolio. 
Hence, when a public bidder acquires a public target, the acquirer’s shareholders will be 
indifferent since, as they are diversified investors, they own stock in both firms. 
However, when a public bidder acquires an unlisted target, the acquirer’s shareholders 
will capture part of the gains of the acquisition (assuming the bid is value increasing). 
 
3. FIRM AND TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS EFFECT ON 
BIDDER WEALTH CREATION. 
Extant literature has documented several determinants of bidder returns that we 
present below. Specifically, we discuss the method of payment for the target, the size of 
the acquirer, the relative size of the target compared to the bidder, whether acquirer and 
target belong to related or unrelated industries and whether the acquisition is a domestic 
or a cross–border transaction. We highlight the related evidence found on privately held 
firm acquisitions. 
 
a. Method of payment 
In the framework of Myers and Majluf (1984) model, bidding firm managers 
will offer stock as the medium of exchange when they believe that their own shares are 
overvalued. Hence, the market reaction to this sort of acquisition proposal will be 
negative. 
On the contrary, evidence on unlisted targets shows that buyers gain higher 
abnormal returns for stock offers relative to cash offers. Fuller et al. (2002) explain this 
different behaviour by the creation of a blockholder (discussed in section 2) and 
favourable tax implications for private firm owners. They argue that when cash is used 
as the mode of payment, the purchasing firm’s owners face immediate tax implications, 
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which are deferred if stock is employed. If this tax deferral option is valuable to owners, 
they may accept a discounted price equal to, at most, the value of the option. This lower 
price will be reflected in the higher bidder returns for stock offers. As a result, Travlos 
(1987), Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) suggest that the listing effect is actually a 
method of payment effect.  
However, Ang and Kohers (2001) for the US market, Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
and Petmezas (2009) for the UK market, and Faccio et al. (2006) for 17 Western 
European countries find similar results: regardless of the payment method, abnormal 
returns for buyers of private targets are significantly greater than zero and significantly 
greater than abnormal returns for buyers of public targets. Therefore, these findings 
suggest that although a method of payment effect exists, it is separate and distinct from 
the listing effect. 
 
b. Size of the acquirer 
Previous literature has documented a size effect in the acquirer’s stock returns in 
which larger bidders get lower abnormal returns. Moeller et al. (2004) perform a 
thorough study of this issue on a large sample of US mergers and acquisitions. They 
find that acquisitions by small firms gain higher abnormal returns. When they split their 
sample into listed and unlisted targets, they report that small buyers obtain significant 
positive abnormal returns regardless of the listing status of the target, but large buyers’ 
gains depend on the listing status of the target firm. Hence, large acquiring firms have 
significant positive abnormal returns for unlisted targets but significant negative 
abnormal returns for listed targets. They conclude that large firms offer larger 
acquisition premiums than small firms, which is consistent with Roll’s (1986) 
managerial hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. 
As Moeller et al. (2004) point out that small firms make small acquisitions and 
large firms make large acquisitions, Faccio et al. (2006) conjecture if their results (that 
is, European acquirers of listed targets gain insignificant abnormal returns but 
significant positive ones when bidding unlisted targets) may be a size effect since larger 
bidders tend to buy listed targets while smaller bidders tend to buy unlisted targets. 
However, they find that both large and small acquirers earn significant positive 
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abnormal returns when buying unlisted targets and negative abnormal returns when 
buying listed targets. 
 
c. Relative size of the acquisition 
Asquith et al. (1983) report that bidders’ abnormal returns are related to the 
relative size of the merger since even good acquisitions could have little impact on the 
purchaser’s stock price if targets are small relative to the bidder. Fuller et al. (2002) 
document, for the US market, that there is a positive relationship between the unlisted 
target’s relative size and the acquirers’ positive abnormal returns; whereas for public 
targets, acquirers gain significant negative abnormal returns if the relative size of the 
target is high.13 Specifically, they find that as the relative size of the target increases for 
a private acquisition, returns to the purchaser using stock are greater than if the buyer 
had used cash. On the other hand, they find that for public targets, as the relative size of 
the target increases, the returns become more positive for cash offers, more negative for 
stock offers, and hardly change for combination offers. Fuller et al. (2002) argue that 
this market reaction discrepancy to the acquisition of private and public targets could be 
explained by: (i) an illiquidity effect in private firms due to a lack of competition in the 
market for privately–held corporate control; and/or (ii) the increasing likelihood of a 
blockholder formation when stock is used as the method of payment since the relative 
size of the private target to the bidder increases.14
Draper and Paudyal (2006) also analyse the relative size effect on listed and 
unlisted bidders’ abnormal returns at the announcement date but for a sample from the 
UK market.
 
15
                                                 
13 They compute the relative size of the target as the target value divided by acquirer market value in 
the month prior to the announcement date. 
 Similarly to Fuller et al. (2002), they report greater significant positive 
abnormal returns for high relative size ratio acquisitions of unlisted targets, though this 
result only holds when the offer is paid with cash since they find greater positive 
14 See section 2 for a further discussion of these clues. 
15 In order to clarify the exposition, we have altered the original results of Draper and Paudyal (2006) as 
they calculate relative size in an inverse way than Fuller et al. (2002), dividing the bidder’s market 
capitalization 10 days prior to the announcement by the value of the deal. 
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abnormal returns for unlisted targets with low relative size ratio when stock is used as 
the mode of payment.16
 
 
d. Related vs. unrelated industry acquisition 
Although diversifying acquisitions are expected to generate operational and 
financial synergies, previous literature [Comment and Jarrell (1995), Healy et al. (1997) 
and more recently Martynova and Renneboog (2011), for instance] documents value 
destruction from unrelated industry (diversifying) acquisitions. Several difficulties with 
diversification have been pointed out as bidders face a higher likelihood of overvaluing 
targets outside of their core business as their knowledge base of the target industry is 
lower [Balakrishna and Koza (1993)], or because of bureaucratic rigidities between 
bidder and target firms [Shin and Stulz (1998)]. 
Evidence on acquisitions of unlisted targets is mixed and most of it comes from 
cross–sectional regression analysis.17 Hence, Ang and Kohers (2001) report that within–
industry acquisitions evoke less positive bidder reactions than diversified deals;18
 In a thorough study, Petmezas (2009) investigates acquisitions during high– and 
low–valuation periods and finds significant positive abnormal announcement returns to 
acquirers of private targets either in diversifying or non–diversifying acquisitions during 
high–valuation periods. During low–valuation periods, diversifying acquisitions of 
unlisted targets show significant positive abnormal returns.
 Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006) show insignificant industry impact on abnormal 
announcement returns for both listed and unlisted targets, whereas Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) find that only acquirers of listed firms show a significant negative effect. 
19
                                                 
16 For public targets they find similar results to Fuller et al. (2002) 
 Therefore, results on 
unlisted target acquisitions do not support the previous evidence.  
17 In this sort of analysis, several independent variables are used in order to explain estimated bidders’ 
abnormal returns. 
18 However, they find insignificant different reaction when they refined their diversification measure by 
controlling cross–industry transactions which are small relative to the size of the acquirer. 
19 Petmezas’ (2009) results for public targets are considerably different from unlisted targets 
acquisitions since non–diversifying acquisitions exhibit significant negative abnormal returns either 
during high– or low–valuation periods while diversifying acquisitions show insignificant abnormal 
returns. 
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Finally, in a related research, Capron and Shen (2007) find that acquirers are less 
likely to buy a private target when they enter a new industry. They suggest that this 
result agrees with difficulties in identifying a private firm outside the buyer’s core 
business or when facing greater evaluative uncertainty when evaluating a private target 
in an unfamiliar domain. 
 
e. Domestic vs. cross–border acquisition 
Firms involved in cross–border acquisitions are likely to benefit from a number 
of synergies that are unavailable to firms involved in domestic acquisitions, like 
expanding their business into new markets as a response to globalisation. Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, the wealth effect may be higher in cross–border deals.20
Focusing on the listing status of the target firm, we discussed above that Hansen 
and Lott (1996) explain the listing effect by arguing that shareholders of the purchaser 
are diversified investors. Faccio et al. (2006) argue that a necessary condition for the 
Hansen and Lott (1996) argument is that shareholders of the acquirer and target 
companies overlap to some extent, and point out that given the wide documented home 
bias in investors’ portfolios [Lewis (1999), for instance] it is highly unlikely that 
shareholders of acquirers will own shares in a significant number of foreign companies. 
If this is the case, abnormal returns for cross–border acquisitions of listed targets should 
be similar to those for unlisted targets. Faccio et al. (2006) results do not support the 
Hansen and Lott (1996) hypothesis as they find significant positive abnormal returns for 
bidders regardless of whether the unlisted targets were domestic or not.
 However, 
regulatory and cultural differences between countries may impede the integration of 
target companies. If the market anticipates these difficulties it may discount the 
expected acquisition gains [Conn et al. (2005), Moeller and Schlingemann (2005)]. 
21
On the contrary, Fuller et al. (2002) report that bids for foreign private firms 
have a negative and significant impact on abnormal returns on the acquisition’s 
 
                                                 
20 Martynova and Renneboog (2011) report higher bidder’s significant positive abnormal returns in 
cross–border acquisitions using a sample with 28 European countries. 
21 They find insignificant abnormal returns when the target company is a listed firm either for domestic 
or cross–border acquisitions. 
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announcement date, but insignificant abnormal returns when the foreign target firm is 
publicly held. 
 
4. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
Information on acquisitions (announcement date, identity of bidders and targets, 
payment method, etc) driven by Spanish listed firms is obtained from the Spanish 
Security Exchange Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores –CNMV) 
web page. Once the official date was identified for each acquisition, we search the 
financial press in Factiva dataset for any previous rumour or leak in order to price the 
market information arrival. Given the Spanish Equity Market Law, the CNMV orders a 
firm trading halt when it considers that a relevant piece of information could affect a 
firm’s market price.22 Thus, we only consider a rumour about an acquisition if the 
CNMV halts trading. Consequently, the event–day (t0
As do Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2006), and others, for an 
acquisition to be included in the sample, we require that it be a “completed control 
acquisition”. We define a completed control acquisition as one in which the buyer 
increased its ownership position to greater than 50%, regardless of the amount of the 
target firm’s stake previously owned by the buyer. Therefore, our initial sample consists 
of all acquisitions conducted by listed firms in the Spanish market (SIBE) over the 
period 1991 to 2006, that is, 180 purchases. For an acquisition announcement to remain 
in the final sample, it needs to meet the following criteria: 
) will coincide with the halt date 
because a rumour appeared in the press or the official acquisition communication date 
to the CNMV. The necessary economic and financial information for this research 
comes from Sociedad de Bolsas S.A. and SABI, Amadeus and Thomson ONE Banker 
data bases. 
(i) We have selected those purchasing firms for which stock market data was 
available in the period that comprises 120 days before and 5 days after the 
                                                 
22 For instance, the CNMV always orders the trading halt of firms involved when a takeover is 
officially announced (article 33 of the Spanish Equity Market Law). 
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acquisition announcement date (event–day). The application of this 
criterion excluded three acquisition announcements. 
(ii) No other contaminating event must exist in the five days prior to and after 
the event–day that may affect the target firm price, such as dividend 
payments, equity issues or stock splits. Six acquisition announcements 
were excluded. 
(iii) We have required that no other acquisition announcements took place by a 
bidder firm in the 120 days before the event–day. We found twenty nine 
such announcements that overlap. 
(iv) Finally, information about the listing status must have been released. Eight 
acquisition announcements were excluded. 
Application of these criteria yielded a sample of 134 acquisitions where 46 of 
the targets were listed on an exchange and 88 were unlisted companies. 
Table 1 exhibits comparative descriptive statistics for acquisitions involving 
privately held and publicly held companies. In line with previous studies from other 
markets, the number of privately held company purchase announcements in our sample 
largely exceeds that for publicly held companies (88 to 46 announcements) and cash is 
employed as the mode of payment in most of the cases both for listed and unlisted target 
bids. The sample shows some interesting features regarding geographical and industry 
characteristics. For example, acquisitions of unlisted targets are equally likely to involve 
a domestic (51%) or a cross–border deal (49%), but in acquisitions of listed targets 
cross–border acquisitions are mainly involved (65%). Using two–digit CNAE codes to 
classify industries,23
                                                 
23 CNAE codes are the Spanish equivalent to US SIC codes. 
 Table 1 indicates, contrary to Capron and Shen (2007) findings, 
that firms acquiring privately held companies focus on a diversification strategy but 
publicly held firm acquisitions are equally likely to be diversifying or within–industry 
transactions. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for acquirer and target companies by listing status of target. An 
acquisition is classified as cross–border if the acquirer and the target are from different countries. 
An acquisition is classified as within–industry if the target has the same primary two–digit CNAE 
code (the Spanish equivalent to US SIC code) as the acquirer. The acquirer’s market value is the 
market value of the acquirer’s common stock in the most recent December or June to the 
acquisition announcement date. Acquirer and target’s total assets are the value of total assets at the 
end of the year prior to the announcement date. Target firm’s relative size is computed as target’s 
total assets divided by acquirer’s total assets. 
 Full sample Listed targets Unlisted targets 
Number of acquisition 
announcements 
   
• Total 134 46 88 
• By method of payment    
Cash 112 33 79 
Stock 12 9 3 
Mixed 8 3 5 
• By geographical scope    
Domestic 61 16 45 
Cross–border 73 30 43 
• By industry scope    
Diversification 92 25 67 
Within–industry 42 21 21 
Market value of the bidder 
(in million €) 
   
Mean 7,744.63 15,889.66 3,487.00 
Median 1,575.56 3,381.38 649.20 
No. cases 134 46 88 
Acquirer total assets 
(in million €) 
   
Mean 18,604.29 36,729.61 9,437.46 
Median 1,459.02 4,514.87 846.45 
No. cases 131 44 87 
Target total assets 
(in million €) 
   
Mean 2,045.13 5,421.29 271.22 
Median 51.10 269.98 23.49 
No. cases 90 31 59 
Relative size of the target    
Mean 0.38 0.57 0.27 
Median 0.04 0.20 0.03 
No. cases 90 31 59 
 
Table 1 also gives data on the size of the bidder and the target and their relative 
sizes. Acquirer’s size is measured (i) by the market value of an acquirer’s common 
stock in the most recent December or June prior to the acquisition announcement date, 
and (ii) by total assets at the end of the year previous to said date. Regardless of how 
size is measured, buyers of listed targets are five times as large as buyers of unlisted 
targets. The target’s size is measured through total assets at the end of the year prior to 
the announcement date. In this case, differences in size between listed and unlisted 
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companies are even greater as the average publicly held target firm is twenty times 
bigger than the average privately held target firm. As a result, the target firm’s relative 
size (computed as the target’s total assets divided by the acquirer’s total assets) is higher 
both on average and median for publicly held companies. 
 
4.2. ESTIMATION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
We employ conventional event study methodology in order to compute 
abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). As stated above, we 
define the event day (t0) as the earlier of the date when the issue is communicated to the 
CNMV and the date when the issue is published by a financial journal and causes a 
bidder’s trading halt. The event window is defined to be an eleven–day window centred 
on the day of the announcement (t0–5, t0+5), and the estimation window 
(‘uncontaminated’ interval) is defined to be a 100–day window (t0–26, t0–125). 
In order to ensure the robustness of our results to model specification, we 
estimate ‘uncontaminated’ risk factors from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and the three–factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) that we show in 
expressions 1 and 2, respectively: 
Rit – Rft = αi + β i (Rmt – Rft) + εit
R
,     [1] 
it – Rft = αi + β i (Rmt – Rft) +si SMBt + hi HMLt + εit
where Rit is the simple daily return of the acquirer firm i on day t, Rft is the daily return 
on Letras del Tesoro (Spanish Treasury Bill), Rmt is the return on a value–weighted 
market index (specifically the Madrid Stock Exchange Index –IGBM), SMBt is the 
difference in the returns of value–weighted portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, 
and HMLt is the difference in the returns of value–weighted portfolios of high book–to–
market stocks and low book–to–market stocks.
,  [2] 
24
In addition, given the size of our samples, we test the significance of average 
abnormal returns with the conventional parametric procedure and bootstrap 
methodology in order to take into account the possibility of non-normality. 
 
                                                 
24 See Fama and French (1992, 1993) for details on the construction of the SMB and HML factors. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. ACQUIRER’S ABNORMAL RETURNS AND TARGET FIRM LISTING 
STATUS 
Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the purchaser’s daily abnormal returns (ARs) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), respectively, in the event–window (t0–5, t0+5) for 
the full sample of acquisitions and for acquisitions classified into listed and unlisted 
targets. In both tables, Panel A shows abnormal returns estimated through the CAPM, 
whereas Panel B shows abnormal returns estimated through the Fama–French three–
factor model. 
Consistent with international evidence, we find in Table 2 that buyers of unlisted 
targets gain significant positive abnormal returns on the acquisition announcement date 
regardless of the model used in the AR estimation. Specifically, bidder firm 
shareholders gain around a 1% abnormal return, while shareholders of firms purchasing 
listed companies experience insignificant negative abnormal returns. As a result, the 
overall sample of acquisitions amounts to a significant positive abnormal return on the 
event–day of 0.53%. 
Faccio et al. (2006) conjecture that any leakage of information would be more 
likely to happen for deals involving two listed firms than for transactions in which only 
the acquirer is listed. If such leakage occurs and the purchase is anticipated, significant 
abnormal returns prior to and zero abnormal returns on the announcement date of listed 
firm acquisitions would be consistent. Nevertheless, as in Faccio et al. (2006), we do 
not find significant abnormal returns prior to the announcement date for acquisitions of 
either listed or unlisted targets. 
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Table 2 
Acquirer’s daily abnormal returns (ARs) around the acquisition announcement 
day (t0). The daily abnormal return for each acquisition is estimated employing in the 
estimation of the ‘uncontaminated’ risk factors the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and Fama–French three–factor model. Daily abnormal returns are calculated 
for the full sample of acquisitions and acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets, 
respectively. Significance for means is based on t–test and bootstrap methodology. All 
the abnormal returns are expressed in percentage. 
Day relative to the 
announcement–day (t0) 
Full sample Listed targets Unlisted targets 
Panel A: Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) estimated through the CAPM 
–5 -0.11 0.08 -0.17 
–4 0.05 -0.16 0.03 
–3 0.16 0.13 0.15 
–2 0.09 0.11 0.04 
–1 0.31** 0.11 0.32 
0 0.53* -0.29 b 1.01*** 
+1 0.58 0.12 0.82 
+2 -0.03 0.36 -0.20 
+3 0.00 0.39 -0.26 
+4 -0.22 0.30 -0.48 
+5 -0.05 0.23 -0.19 
Panel B: Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) estimated through the Fama–
French three–factor model 
–5 -0.09 0.06 -0.12 
–4 0.05 -0.15 0.03 
–3 0.17 0.13 0.17 
–2 0.12 0.14 0.07 
–1 0.26 0.03 0.28 
0 0.53* -0.27 b 0.99*** 
+1 0.55 0.15 0.77 
+2 0.00 0.43 -0.20 
+3 -0.01 0.45 -0.30 
+4 -0.16 0.36 -0.44 
+5 -0.05 0.24 -0.18 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using 
the t–test. 
***, **, *
 
 Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using 
bootstrap methodology. 
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Table 3 
Acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition 
announcement day (t0). The cumulative abnormal return is estimated employing in the 
estimation of the ‘uncontaminated’ risk factors the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and Fama–French three–factor model. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated for different intervals around the acquisition announcement day (t0). Table 
exhibits results for the full sample of acquisitions and acquisitions of listed and unlisted 
targets, respectively. Significance for means is based on t–test and bootstrap 
methodology. All the cumulative abnormal returns are expressed in percentage. 
Interval relative to the 
announcement–day (t0) 
Full sample Listed targets Unlisted targets 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) estimated through the CAPM 
(–1,+1) c 1.42*** -0.06 c 2.15*** 
(–1,0) b 0.84** -0.18 b 1.32*** 
(0,+1) 1.11* -0.16 c 1.83*** 
(–5,+5) 1.30 1.38 1.06* 
(–5,0) c 1.03* -0.03 c 1.37** 
(1,+5) 0.28 c 1.41* -0.31 
(–2,+2) 1.48** 0.41 1.98** 
(–2,0) b 0.93** -0.08 b 1.36*** 
(+1,+2) 0.55 0.49 0.62 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) estimated through the 
Fama–French three–factor model  
(–1,+1) c 1.34** -0.10 c 2.04*** 
(–1,0) c 0.79** -0.24 b 1.27*** 
(0,+1) 1.08* -0.13 c 1.76*** 
(–5,+5) 1.36* 1.58 1.05 
(–5,0) c 1.04** -0.06 c 1.41** 
(1,+5) 0.32 c 1.64** -0.36 
(–2,+2) 1.46* 0.47 1.91* 
(–2,0) b 0.91** -0.11 b 1.33** 
(+1,+2) 0.54 0.58 0.57 
a, b, c  Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using 
the t–test. 
***, **, *
 
 Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using 
bootstrap methodology. 
 
Table 3 reports, and Figure 1 illustrates, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for different intervals inside the event–window (t0–5, t0+5). All the intervals that contain 
the event–day (t0) show significant positive CARs when buying an unlisted target, being 
the three–day interval (t0–1, t0+1) that shows the higher CAR (2.15% with CAPM and 
2.04% with Fama–French model). Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that during the post–
announcement period (t0+1, t0+5), the average CAR for unlisted firm acquisitions 
insignificantly declines (–0.34% or –0.36%, depending on the model) but the average 
CAR for listed target companies significantly increases (1.41% or 1.64%, depending on 
the model). These results would be consistent either with post–announcement additional 
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information releases about the acquisition that may alter investor perception on the 
value creation or with investors slowly processing the information released on the 
announcement date. 
 
Figure 1. CAR of acquisition firms 
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5.2. ACQUIRER’S ABNORMAL RETURNS ACCORDING TO FIRM AND 
TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS 
Given the evidence shown in Tables 2 and 3 of a listing status effect, now we 
explore if bidder, target and transaction characteristics may affect the acquiring 
shareholder’s value creation. Table 4 exhibits results for three–day window CARs 
centred on the announcement date (t0–1, t0+1) when the sample is split according to 
these characteristics. 
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Table 4 
Acquirer’s three–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by characteristics of acquirer, deal, 
target and listing status of target. Table exhibits three–day window CARs centred on the 
announcement date (t0–1, t0+1) and associate statistics. CARs are estimated employing in the estimation 
of the ‘uncontaminated’ risk factors the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama–French three–
factor model. The top number for each group is the acquirer’s mean CAR and the second number is the 
number of observations. Significance for means is based on t–test and bootstrap methodology. All the 
cumulative abnormal returns are expressed in percentage. 
 CAPM  Fama–French three–factor model  
 Full 
sample 
Listed 
targets 
Unlisted 
targets 
 Full 
sample 
Listed 
targets 
Unlisted 
targets 
Panel A: By method of payment      
Cash c 1.61*** 0.58 c 2.11***  b 1.51*** 0.50 c 1.99*** 
 112 33 79  112 33 79 
Stock 0.65 0.59 0.83  0.72 0.66 0.88 
 12 9 3  12 9 3 
Mixed 0.16 1.65 3.54  0.13 1.70 3.48 
 8 3 5  8 3 5 
Stock+Mixed 0.45 -0.93 2.52  0.48 -0.87 2.51 
 20 12 8  20 12 8 
Panel B: By size of the acquirer      
Big -0.19 -1.27 0.32  -0.28 -1.35 0.19 
 65 31 34  65 31 34 
Small b 3.03*** 2.44 a 3.41***  b 2.96*** 2.50 c 3.32*** 
 69 15 54  69 15 54 
Panel C: By relative size of the acquisition     
High 1.28 1.65 1.00  1.27 1.71 0.93 
 55 21 34  55 21 34 
Low 0.29 -2.60* b 1.12***  0.16 -2.81* b 1.00*** 
 35 10 25  35 10 25 
Panel D: By related vs. unrelated industry acquisition     
Diversifying 1.52* -0.14 b 1.11***  1.41 -0.07 c 1.03** 
 92 25 67  92 25 67 
Within–industry 2.79 0.04 5.45 *  2.62 -0.12 c 5.25** 
 42 21 21  42 21 21 
Panel E: By domestic vs. cross–border acquisition     
Domestic 0.96 1.65 0.71  0.87 1.70 0.57 
 61 16 45  61 16 45 
Cross–border 1.77* -0.97 3.65*  1.70* -1.05 c 3.58*** 
 73 30 43  73 30 43 
a, b, c  Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using the t–test. 
***, **, *
 
 Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using bootstrap 
methodology. 
 
5.2.1. METHOD OF PAYMENT 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that when acquisitions are paid for with cash, 
shareholders of acquiring firms gain significant positive abnormal returns for unlisted 
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target biddings but insignificant CARs when acquiring a listed company. This result 
differs from Chang’s (1998) for the US market, but is similar to Fuller et al. (2002) and 
Moeller et al. (2004) also for the US market, Draper and Paudyal (2004) and Petmezas 
(2009) for the UK market, and Faccio et al. (2006) for 17 European countries. 
The results when cash is the mode of payment are consistent with a different 
level of competition in the market for listed and unlisted corporate control as we 
discussed in section 2. Hence, insignificant abnormal returns for buyers of listed targets 
reflect a zero NPV transaction due to a highly competitive market, whereas positive 
abnormal returns for purchasers of unlisted targets show that the acquiring firm’s 
shareholders appropriate the excess value gained from underpayment. 
Although we do not find significant abnormal returns when the choice of 
payment is different from all–cash bids either for listed or unlisted targets, evidence is 
inconclusive due to the small size of the subsamples, even when we combine 
acquisitions paid only with stocks and with a mix of cash and stocks. In any event, the 
scarce number of all–stock bids implies that the explanation based on a reduction of 
agency costs of the acquirer firm by the creation of an outside blockholder does not 
hold. 
 
5.2.2. SIZE OF THE ACQUIRER 
Panel B of Table 4 exhibits average three–day CARs of listed and unlisted 
targets sorted by the size of the acquiring company. We classify buyers according to 
their market value, where the market value is computed as number of shares outstanding 
times market price per share at the end of the most recent December or June prior to the 
acquisition announcement date. Then we classify an acquirer as big if its market value is 
greater than the median market value of all companies listed in the Spanish market on 
the date of its market value computation. Otherwise, the acquirer is classified as small. 
We find that only small firms that bid unlisted targets experience significant 
positive abnormal returns. All other classifications show insignificant abnormal returns. 
These results differ from those achieved by Moeller et al. (2004) for the US market and 
Faccio et al. (2006) for 17 European countries (see section 3.b). 
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Our evidence suggests that there is not a size effect that explains our results (that 
is, significant positive abnormal returns for unlisted targets and insignificant ones for 
listed targets) since not only large buyers experience insignificant abnormal returns but 
small acquirers that buy listed targets also experience them. Instead, our results seem to 
confirm that (i) big acquirers pay greater premiums regardless the listing status of the 
target, as Moeller et al. (2004) point out; and (ii) buyers, regardless of their size, pay 
greater premiums for listed companies due to higher competition in the market for 
corporate control. 
 
5.2.3. RELATIVE SIZE OF THE ACQUISITION 
We partition the returns to purchasers on the relative size of the target company 
compared to the purchaser in Panel C of Table 4. The relative size of the target is 
computed as the target’s total assets divided by the acquirer’s total assets. We classify a 
relative size as high if it is greater than the sample median relative size, and low 
otherwise. 
High relative size buyers earn insignificant abnormal returns for both listed and 
unlisted targets. In contrast, low relative size acquirers gain (slightly) significant 
negative abnormal returns for public companies but significant positive abnormal 
returns for unlisted firms. This evidence diverges from that reported by Fuller et al. 
(2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) and it is contrary to the notion that as 
acquisitions of small companies generate smaller amounts of synergy (in absolute 
terms), even good acquisitions could have little impact on the buyer’s stock price if 
targets are small relative to the buyer.  
Our results support the notions that (i) the acquisition of smaller and less well–
known firms are viewed by investors as value–orientated transactions; and (ii) there 
exists an illiquidity effect in private firms due to a lack of competition in the market for 
privately–held corporate control which is particularly intense for smaller unlisted firms. 
On the other hand, as most of the acquisitions in our sample are non all–stock bids, the 
results do not support an explanation based on a large blockholder formation that could 
reduce agency costs. 
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5.2.4. RELATED VS. UNRELATED INDUSTRY ACQUISITION 
In Panel D of Table 4 we compare announcement abnormal returns to 
diversifying and within–industry acquisitions for acquirers of privately and publicly 
held companies. An acquisition is classified as within–industry if both the acquirer and 
the target have the same 2–digit CNAE code. 
In contrast to previous evidence, we find significant positive abnormal returns 
for buyers of unlisted targets but insignificant ones for buyers of listed targets either in 
diversifying or within–industry acquisitions. Significant positive abnormal returns for 
unlisted acquisitions are greater when both the acquirer and the target are from the same 
industry. Therefore, our results do not suggest value destruction from unrelated industry 
acquisitions. 
 
5.2.5. DOMESTIC VS. CROSS–BORDER ACQUISITION 
Results in Panel E of Table 4 suggest a significant positive reaction to cross–
border acquisitions of unlisted target firms as the level of significance is low. All other 
classifications show insignificant acquirers’ abnormal returns. 
Our results diverge from those of Fuller et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006) 
and support Hansen and Lott’s (1996) conjecture. Though Faccio et al. (2006) argue 
that abnormal returns for cross–border acquisitions of listed targets should be similar to 
those for unlisted targets under the hypothesis proposed by Hansen and Lott (1996), our 
evidence suggests that acquiring companies’ shareholders positively value the 
acquisition of companies that are very unlikely to be in their portfolios. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study is the first research that investigates the wealth created for Spanish 
listed firms’ shareholders around acquisition announcements for listed and unlisted 
target companies over the period 1991–2006. As in other foreign markets (US, UK and 
several continental European countries) bidders of listed companies earn insignificant 
average abnormal returns, whereas acquirers of unlisted firms gain significant positive 
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average abnormal returns regardless of the pricing model used in the estimation 
procedure. 
As well, we investigate if value creation is related to bidder, target and 
transaction characteristics. Specifically, we explore the method of payment for the 
target firm, the size of the acquirer, the relative size of the target compared to the 
acquirer, whether the buyer and the target belong to related or unrelated industries and 
whether the acquisition is a domestic or a cross–border transaction. In general terms our 
results diverge from those reported in the literature for other foreign markets. 
Our evidence suggests that the positive reaction of the purchasing firm’s 
shareholder wealth to unlisted firm acquisitions is mainly related to characteristics 
associated with the unlisted companies themselves. That is, unlisted firms tend to be 
smaller and less well–known and therefore, when they are involved in an acquisition 
process, this lack of information leads to lower competition in the market for corporate 
control. Consequently, the payment of lower premiums and the possibility of 
diversifying shareholder’s portfolios lead to unlisted firm acquisitions being viewed as 
value–orientated transactions. 
Finally, though further investigation will be required to identify fundamental 
factors behind the listing status phenomenon, managers who are about to evaluate 
alternative acquisitions may take into account the listing status of target companies.   
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